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Abstract: Traditionally, liberals have confined religion to the sphere of the ‘private’ or 
‘non-political’. However, recent debates over the use of religious symbols in public 
spaces, state financing of faith schools, and tax relief for religious organisations suggest 
that this distinction is not particularly useful in easing the tension between liberal ideas of 
equality among citizens and freedom of religion. This article deals with one aspect of this 
debate, which concerns whether members of religious communities should receive 
exemptions from regulations that place a distinctively heavy burden on them. For 
supporters of exemptions, protection for diverse practices and religious beliefs justifies 
such a special treatment. For others, this is a form of positive discrimination incompatible 
with equal citizenship.  
Drawing on Habermas’ understanding of churches as ‘communities of 
interpretation’ this article explores possible alternative solutions to both the ‘rule-and-
exemption’ approach and the ‘neutralist’ approach. Our proposal rests on the idea of 
mutual learning between secular and religious perspectives. On this interpretation, what 
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is required is, firstly, generation and maintenance of public spaces in which there could 
be discussion and dialogue about particular cases, and, secondly, evaluation of whether 
the basic conditions of moral discourse are present in these spaces. Thus deliberation 
becomes a touchstone for the building of a shared democratic ethos.  
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Since the 1980s, the debate over the role of religion in liberal democracy has gained 
renewed attention in both theory and practice. Several governments in Europe and the US 
have granted religious organisations financial support, tax relief and sometimes even 
exemption from universally applicable laws such as antidiscrimination laws and 
mandatory education (Minow 2007). Politicians, as well as political theorists, grapple 
with two main issues: the role and scope that religion should have in public spaces, and 
the legitimacy of state intervention in regulating the life of religious organisations with 
regard to freedom of association. In particular, a persistent concern is whether rules 
tailored for religious groups and organisations lead to discriminatory practices with 
respect to non-religious citizens and organisations (Barry 2001). Cases debated at the 
level of public opinion, such as the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in France, Spain and 
Holland (Galeotti 1993), or the request by Sikhs in the UK and Canada to be permitted to 
wear traditional dress (Levy 1997), serve as examples of the deep conflict generated by 
requests for differential treatment on religious grounds. Why should religion be a source 
of special treatment in pluralistic societies? What are the features of religion and religious 
affiliation that justify differential treatment and departure from universally applied rules? 
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In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to widen the perspective and 
understand the role assigned to religion by liberals. In particular, in the section Liberals 
and Religion we identify a classical liberal position that relegates religion to the realm of 
the private and excludes it from the sphere of the public and political (Rawls 1999; Barry 
2001). A more positive view on religion, explored in the following section, is offered by 
those authors that we call ‘reformists’2 (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997; Bader 1999 and 
2003; Weithman 1995). These promote an approach of ‘accommodation’ and ‘structural 
integration’ of religion in the democratic political space. Their argument is based on two 
propositions: criticism of traditional separation between the private and the public; and 
the idea that religious traditions can make a valuable contribution to the public sphere. 
We propose a more radical critique of the private/public distinction. The article supports 
a Habermasian deliberative democracy approach to the issue of exemptions on religious 
grounds by contrasting it on the one hand with a liberal approach, and on the other hand 
with a reformist perspective. Following Jürgen Habermas’ (2008a) theory of 
deliberative democracy, we identify churches and religious groups as‘ ‘interpretative 
communities’’ which can be trained to present arguments regarding public matters, with 
the sole condition that they be universally comprehensible and plausible (see the 
penultimate section on Complementary learning processes). Within this framework, in 
the concluding section, we develop a possible answer to the question of whether 
religious groups and organisations should, at least in certain cases, be granted 
differential treatment. On our account, what is required is: firstly, generation and 
maintenance of public spaces to provide a platform for discussion and dialogue about 
concrete cases; and, secondly, evaluation of whether the four basic conditions of moral 
discourse are present within these spaces. That is, evaluation of whether the demand for 
an exemption would stand up to: 1) an open public discussion in which all affected 
parties could participate; 2) a situation in which all interlocutors would be on equal 
footing while presenting their arguments; 3) a situation in which all persons express 
their sincere ideas; and 4) the requirement that there be no other coercion – that is, that 
the driving force truly be that of the best argument.  
                                                 
2 We use ‘reformist’ because their proposals are intended to develop the ideals of membership and 
participation without relinquishing the core presumptions of liberal democracy. Thus, behind the shared 
reformism, lie different political philosophical backgrounds, such as communitarianism or republicanism. 
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Should a demand for a concrete exemption pass this test, it would imply neither a 
prejudice nor a danger to deliberative democracy and could be accepted. Indeed, it would 
strengthen deliberative democracy insofar as it would open up a space for contestation 
and re-discussion of commonly accepted rules. We shall argue that differential treatment 
for religious groups can be justified if we adopt a more positive view of religion as a 
source of motivation and as a space within which to cultivate lively contexts for the 
development of ideas and reasons that can contribute to the public life. Exemptions are 




Liberals and religion 
 The issue of possible religious exemptions to universally applicable laws highlights key 
sites of contestation about the nature of the liberal polity – both among liberals and their 
critics. Thus the tension between religious freedom on the one hand and the equality of 
citizens on the other – and the very notion of the separation of church and state – raise 
questions about the very self-understanding, and the viability, of a liberal democracy. No 
consensus exists as to how these  questions ought to be  negotiated. Consequently,  
political responses to claims to religious exemption have been plural both in theory and in 
practice.  
Generally speaking, within the liberal tradition, demands for exemptions by 
religious groups to the fulfilment of certain laws have been met with unambiguous 
negatives (Marshall 1990, pp. 386-400).3 This can be attributed to the need to respect 
those principles, including equality of citizens and the separation of Church and State, 
which regulate co-existence within liberal democracies. However, this position is 
tempered by other considerations related to the nature of religion. An examination of all 
                                                 
3 Some liberal authors have also recently drawn attention to the relevance of religion. In particular, Bou-
Habib (2006) critically characterises religion as a ‘basic good’ or an ‘intense preference’. He argues that 
religious conduct can be a ‘derivative good’, with its value stemming from the integrity of the religious 
person. Liberal multiculturalism also concedes that some cultutal and religious exemptions are necessary in 
order to preserve other values such authonomy and equal respect. All these perspective register a tension 
between ‘public’ obligations and ‘private’ obligations deriving from religious membership. 
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of these elements will assist in understanding the positioning of both liberals and their 
critics (reformists) on this issue. It will also facilitate the positioning of our proposal on a 
middle ground, discussed in this article and based on Habermasian thought, which in turn 
is grounded in a proposal of deliberative democracy rooted in discourse ethics.4 
Habermas’ viewpoint retains a reformist position but preserves the boundaries of liberal 
thought. 
Liberals tend to tackle the presence of religion in the public sphere by appeal to a 
polarised distinction between the ‘‘public’’ and the ‘‘private’’. The ‘public’ incorporates 
decisions concerning coercive acts, including those aspects of society which are under 
state control and therefore tied into the public interest (Hollenbach 1993, pp. 880-888). 
The ‘private’ concerns those aspects of individual lives which lie beyond rightful state 
control, such as family, business, leisure time and conception of the good. The purpose of 
this distinction is twofold. First, it establishes a separation between the State and religion 
in such a way that the Government cannot base decisions on the dictates of any particular 
religion and citizens should not base public participation on religious motives. The 
second intention is further reaching: that of confining religious beliefs to the believer’s 
own conscience. Thus from this angle, interpersonal relations in our pluralist societies 
should be viewed through a secularly-based principle of equal treatment of persons.5 In 
this context, religious exemption would be unacceptable, for two reasons: it would 
presume the intervention of religious convictions in an area where they have no place; 
and, more to the point, religious exemption in itself is understood to imply unfair 
discrimination of citizens (Marshall 1990, p. 404). 
Liberals’ concern to exclude religion from the public sphere, as well as their 
difficulty to justify religious exemptions, reflects the pejorative conception of religion 
held by many liberal theorists. This may be reduced to two essential elements: its 
characterisation as a cause of conflict among citizens, and its inconsistency with reason –  
and therefore unintelligibility. We will begin with the first element. 
                                                 
4 See Noonan 2005, pp. 103-110 for an overview of the characteristics of a deliberative democracy rooted 
in discourse ethics. 
5 This dichotomy between public and private spheres would be rejected both by defenders of religion in the 
public realm and by Habermas, through deliberative democracy, as we shall see later.  
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Since the Reformation, religion in the public sphere has been perceived as a threat 
to social peace in the context of moral pluralism (Audi 1997, p. 34). Its admission to the 
public sphere meant the submission of political powers to the dictates of a specific church 
with the nefarious consequences this implied. For this reason, it seemed that the best way 
to avoid religious conflict was to deprive religion of any influence in public life, leaving 
it to the realm of the individual conscience and private relations among believers (Locke 
1999, p. 79). Thus, religion was privatised, following its expulsion from the public arena 
and reclusion within the personal conscience.6 
Liberals today continue to maintain this idea. Rawls, for instance, introduces the 
notion of ‘civil duty’. This requires people to vote not according to the dictates of their 
comprehensive doctrines or personal interests but only from the perspective of the 
common good, thus avoiding using the State’s coercive power to impose their own 
comprehensive views (Rawls 1996, p. 251). Similarly, Audi defends the claim that 
secular motivations may be acceptable for all citizens, while religious convictions are 
always a cause for confrontation. Thus, anyone supporting a measure solely on religious 
grounds would be imposing his conception of the good on others (Audi 1989, p. 283). 
However, this argument is criticised by revisionist authors such as Habermas (2008a) for 
representing an attitude incapable of recognising the positive value of religion within the 
public realm. 
Let us turn now to the second element of the liberal conception of religion: an 
appeal to the unintelligible character of religion. At the heart of the liberal argument lies a 
dichotomy between two clearly defined spheres: that of practical reason and that of 
revealed faith. The former is a mutually accessible sphere, being common to all rational 
citizens. In contrast to this accessibility, revealed religion constitutes a sphere which is 
per se inaccessible, given that it starts from experiences which are alien to common 
reason, such as faith or theophany (Greenawalt 1990, p. 1031). Thus, practical reason and 
faith constitute two mutually exclusive realms (Kant 1999, B XXIV-XXVI). 
                                                 
6 The reclusion of religion to the conscience of the believer was in fact a triumph of the Protestant 
Reformation, which decided, based on theses such as the free interpretation of the Scriptures, that the 
relation between God and man was a direct one, through one’s conscience, and not through an institution or 
hierarchy, as held by Catholicism.  
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As a matter of fact, on the liberal view, the rational and the intelligible are 
assimilated within the realm of the secular. Religion, by contrast, is regarded as irrational 
and unintelligible (Audi 1997, p. 17). Accordingly the secular is seen as accessible or 
intelligible to anyone, including believers. By contrast, the religious one is opaque to 
reason and cannot be understood by other persons (Bird 1996). Thus, they cannot be 
admitted within the public sphere. This attempt to deny all cognitive value to religious 
expression poses a problem for deliberative democracy, as it constitutes an impossible 
position within the framework of post-secular society, to use Habermas’ terminology. 
The above account should shed light on why religion has been treated with special 
cynicism by liberal thinkers, and its exclusion by them from the public realm. On the one 
hand, given that religious motivations are always sectarian, they must remain relegated to 
the realm of the private (Bradley 1991, p. 317). On the other hand, religion, unlike 
secular philosophies, was considered alien to the shared dominion of reason. Thus, claims 
based on religious convictions could never be subject to public corroboration, which was 
the minimum needed to obtain legitimacy within the context of pluralism. 
From the liberal viewpoint, what makes religions special is that they are sources 
of conflicts and, accordingly, must remain outside the configurative procedures of public 
and political space. This is because claims that are not universal, and cannot be the object 
of agreement in society, do not merit a place in the context of liberal public justification. 
Thus, traditionally, the liberal position is that religions ought not to enjoy any exemption 
from universally applicable rules. 
 
The value of religion in the public sphere 
Exemptions to the rule, conscientious objections and civil disobedience are often framed 
in relation to personal matters of conscience, on the one hand, and the positive norms of 
the political community, on the other. It has often been thought that the question: ‘When 
are we justified in disobeying law?’ (Jones 2004, p. 336) can be answered in liberal 
democracy by the relegation of religious and ethical beliefs to the private sphere, and by 
defending the priority of the right over the good (Rawls 1971).  
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Faced with these liberal arguments, in this section we identify two possible ways,  
each with different implications, to concede that there is value in religion. The first is to 
take the view of certain non-liberal authors, reformists, who argue from diverse 
philosophical starting points that some exemptions can be granted in order to guarantee 
freedom of speech and expression, and more in general to enable participation of 
religious people in the public life. Another perspective is provided by deliberative 
democracy and based on discourse ethics and makes possible justifying some exceptions 
in order to provide religious organisations with the means for becoming ‘communities of 
interpretation’. Its proponents include Habermas (1996, 1998) and Cortina (1993, 2001).  
Some reformists, including Bader, Taylor, MacIntyre and Weithman, stress that 
religion is a substantial part of social reality. Elimination of religion from the public 
sphere would, they argue, constitute an injustice which would lead to further damage 
rather than to any good. For Weithman, the institutional principle of political neutrality 
requires that one: ‘leave… aside very important questions about what else a commitment 
to the ideals of freedom and democracy requires’ (Weithman 1991, p. 54). Bader (2003) 
affirms more radically: ‘The more or less radical exclusion of religious reasons and 
arguments from public debate and politics has extensively been criticised as morally 
arbitrary, unfair, incompatible with freedoms of communication, and practically 
counterproductive’ (Bader 2003, p. 4).  
The idea is that treating people justly does not require abstraction from all of their 
cultural and religious particularities. Rather, it means taking them into consideration in an 
impartial manner. Authors who opt for a proposal of ‘accommodation’ or ‘structural 
pluralism’ include: liberal protestants such as Steven, Smith and Wolterstorff; liberal 
Catholics such as Perry, Glendon, and Novak; and even defenders of the egalitarianism of 
democratic institutional pluralism, such as Bader. All these streams of thought are 
strongly critical of the liberal ‘separationist’ vision and offer political theories which 
better respond to the complex relationship between religion and society. 
From this perspective, the question of whether determined religious groups are 
justified in not obeying laws which conflict with their beliefs would have a positive, 
prima facie response. Jones states: ‘A society might recognise the difficulty faced by 
these of its citizens and circumvent it by exempting them from the demands of the 
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relevant law.’ (Jones 2004, p. 328) He cites as an example the exemption made for Sikhs 
in the United Kingdom, allowing them not to wear helmets and permitting them to carry 
bladed weapons in public. 
However, Jones’ responses prompt a deeper discussion of the view of religion set 
out by standard liberalism. For example, Bader offers the following serious criticisms of 
the central precepts of liberalism as depicted in the previous section.   
Firstly, the liberal model of a ‘well-ordered society’ in which free, rational 
citizens decide how to organise themselves according to an ideal that clashes with liberal 
democratic practices. On this account, the difference between constitutions, states and 
liberal democratic societies is not taken into account. This confusion between the ideal 
model and the actual states is apparent in certain liberal ideas, such as consolidation of 
discrimination and inequality as ‘difference-blind neutrality’. In the real world, states are 
not, de facto, neutral with respect to organised religions, and therefore any intended 
(impossible) neutrality would lead to discrimination against minority religions.  
Secondly, the liberal model assumes too much consensus. According to Bader 
(1999) and Gutmann and Thompson (1990), the liberal conception undervalues moral 
pluralism. Liberalism transmits the illusion that consensus may be reached by delving 
into the basis of moral conflicts or by raising ourselves to the second-order principles. 
However, in reality, discrepancies linked to political and moral matters are a serious issue 
for citizens, not only for jurists and moral philosophers. It is truly difficult to reach a 
consensus on morally controversial topics such as abortion, genetic research or 
euthanasia, although decades have been spent debating them. 
Thirdly, one of the more serious and far-reaching critiques of liberalism concerns 
its two main dichotomies: public versus private and secular versus religious. The critique 
would justify renouncing the neutrality of a liberal democracy and giving a public role to 
religion. Liberal strategies to separate the public from the private, the political from the 
moral, and the secular from the religious, and to purge public reason of illegitimate 
influences are described by Bader as ‘unfair, exclusionist, unachievable, 
counterproductive, or self-defeating’ (Bader 1999, p. 601). These distinctions do not 
function in the real world. In the worst cases, these liberal strategies favour the powerful 
and those with the greatest resources. Furthermore, the pretence of neutrality and the 
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exclusion of religion from public life ignores the valuable contribution made by religions 
to public affairs throughout history (Weithman 1991).  
Fourthly, liberals have forgotten the importance of virtues. As with the previous 
argument, the point can be made that religions play a key role in the development of 
character and motivating moral action. In contrast to the ‘coldness’ of rules, processes 
and duties, religious traditions have offered meaning, a sense of belonging and an interest 
in transcendence. 
When it comes to supporting democracy, what matters are the contributions that 
can be made to questions of rights, culture and practical attitudes, not whether these stem 
from a religious or a secular source7.  
One of the key principles of liberal democracy is freedom of conscience, of 
opinion and of expression. If we link this belief to the realm of religion we can identify 
the ‘freedom to’ believe and the ‘freedom from’ state intervention in religious matters. In 
many cases, guaranteeing the positive freedom to believe in or practice a religion implies 
state intervention, which may in turn lead to conflict with the aspiration for religions 
freedom from state interference (Bader 2003, p. 275). Furthermore, it is a duty of the 
State to protect believers from their ‘own’ religious groups, associations and leaders. As 
Quong asks: ‘What happens when a minority group says, ‘this practice is important to our 
identity’, but intra-group minorities dissent from the majority opinion?’ (2004, p. 43) 
This has important implications for how we should regard questions of 
exemption, conscientious objection, and even civil disobedience. None of these imply a 
rejection of democracy, but ought to be understood as a manifestation of the demos. Each 
constitutes an exercise in public deliberation and in that sense forms part of the 
democratic process in its broadest sense (Jones 2004, Smith 2004). In fact, the radical 
expulsion of religion from public space, as proposed by some liberals, would work 
against one of the basic principles of deliberative democracy (Smith 2004), given that it 
would involve ‘de facto’ exclusion of some people from public debate. If individuals are 
                                                 
7 Bader (1999, p. 602) expresses this idea forcefully: ‘The important thing, given the priority of democracy, 
should not be whether arguments are religious or secular but whether arguments, attitudes and practices are 
compatible with the principles, rights, culture, virtues, and good practices of social, democratic 
constitutionalism.’ 
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permitted to participate but are hindered from making proposals based on their deep, 
sincere religious convictions, they will ‘feel’ excluded from the deliberation. Smith 
(2004, p. 369) argues that there may be situations in which the prohibition of certain 
points of view and relevant opinions may make civil disobedience appropriate. 
Accordingly, reformist authors (particularly Bader) argue that religious beliefs 
and organised religions must participate in public debate. Drawing on Richard Rorty, 
they propose a formula of ‘priority for democracy’. ‘Priority for democracy should not be 
confused with a secularist strategy to purify public reason from religious arguments.’ 
(Bader 1999, p. 602) This argument implies that the principles, institutions, cultures, 
virtues and practices of a liberal democracy have priority over the fundamentals of liberal 
democracy, whether religious, philosophical or scientific (Bader 2003).8 
On this line of argument, faith-based reasons may be considered essential for the 
construction of the public sphere, and even justified for the legitimate configuration of 
the political space. Nonetheless, the manner in which both secular and faith-based 
reasons may be articulated needs to be clearly defined. We need to ask such questions as: 
‘Is there a place for religious beliefs in the configuration of the public sphere in 
democratic societies?’, and if so: ‘Do religious beliefs sometimes require special 
treatment in a pluralistic society?’ To put it another way: ‘Should religious groups at least 
in certain cases be exempt from civil rights laws?’ 
A reconsideration of the value of religion, drawing on discourse ethics, with a 
corresponding understanding of democracy as deliberative democracy, is, in our opinion, 
                                                 
8 We wish to insist that following this argument would in no way imply the claim that religious norms and 
traditions must be respected per se and that the State must abstain from interfering in all religious practices. 
Of course, some of these practices must be considered manifestations of freedom of conscience which may 
clash with other basic political rights, but both are relevant for citizens and it is difficult to prioritise one 
over the other (Weithman 1995, p. 32). Here it is crucial to distinguish between practices such as the 
consumption of peyote in some religious Amerindian ceremonies or the ritual sacrifice of animals, which 
pose no harm to other people, and practices which attack the dignity and basic rights of people. Religious 
practices which lead to domestic violence, genital mutilation, sexual abuse or collective suicide, for 
example, must be prohibited by the State. ‘Here, criminal law should step in: priority for liberal democracy 
must be strong enough to legitimize public scrutiny and interference to sanction these practices effectively.’ 
(Bader 2003, p. 277). 
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a good path on which to find well-rooted answers to these questions.9 The following 
section deals with this perspective.  
 
Complementary learning processes between secular and religious beliefs 
The key idea of deliberative democracy does not so much concern how the political space 
is configured, as how it ought to be configured in order to establish moral legitimacy. For 
this reason it includes two principles.10 Firstly, the principle of universalisation [U]: ‘A 
norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general 
observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly 
accepted by all concerned without coercion.’ (Habermas 1998, p. 42) Secondly, the 
discourse principle [D]: ‘Only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the 
acceptance of all concerned in practical discourse.’ (Habermas 1998, p. 41) 
As we may observe, procedures in which norms are legitimised are crucial for a 
deliberative democracy. It would be unacceptable to leave aside religiously-based 
arguments, because what matters is guaranteeing a process from which a valid norm will 
emerge.  
This proposal for deliberative democracy draws on liberal and republican 
conceptions (Habermas 1996, pp. 287-387) of the State and civil society, both of which 
are indispensable for the ethical configuration of the political arena. Habermas argues 
that liberal and the republican understandings of politics both commit two errors which 
are overcome by the deliberative democracy model. Firstly, they uphold the philosophical 
                                                 
9 To address the response which has emerged from critical theory, we focus on Habermas’ (1996, 1998, 
2008a, 2008b) and Cortina’s (1993, 1995, 1998, 2001) works and thought. 
10 With the U principle, which establishes the conditions for discourse, one may distinguish norms which 
are morally valid, as each affected subject is obliged to accommodate himself to and understand the 
perspective of others before expressing his own interests. In other words, each must enter into dialogues 
whose objective is understanding and in which the participants take one another into consideration as valid 
interlocutors. Now, as we enter the territory of configuring a morally legitimate political space, one must 
take into account not only this principle, but also that in which juridical-political norms comply with the D 
principle. This then establishes that it is the actual participants in the discourse, those affected by the moral 
norm in question, who take on the role of protagonists through their active participation in the dialogue 
aimed at understanding. At the same time, one affirms that the types of reasons or judgements emitted are 
those which must be examined in each process of debate. 
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model of the subject’s conscience,11 and, secondly, they confuse the public with the 
political-state sphere.12  
The key issue is to establish communicative conditions in the political process. 
Only in this way can one expect to produce rational results, as the process is deliberative 
throughout. Precisely these communicative conditions would permit the establishment of 
a framework from which to sketch the role religious groups could play in configuring the 
public sphere, as well as providing an insight into their role in shaping the political and 
juridical space. 
In his last articles, Habermas addresses the theme of religion (2008a, 2008b), 
making two relevant and convincing points.13 Firstly, religion has the right to make itself 
heard not only publicly but also politically. Secondly, democracy must listen to this 
voice, for the good of politics.14 His position, in Conill’s words (2007, p. 573), ‘now 
favours the line of those who have defended a hermeneutic articulation among reason 
and religion’. These include Cortina (1995, 1998, 2001), who employs the same 
presuppositions of discourse ethics theory. 
The starting point lies in recognition of our location in a post-secular society 
with three distinctive characteristics. The first is that the context is increasingly secular, 
whilst at the same time there is a continual presence of religious communities. The 
second is that religious communities functionally contribute to society insofar as they 
                                                 
11 The error here lies in considering that any interest is true and valid simply by virtue of being ‘mine’ or 
‘ours’. For both models of political philosophy, the interest is a given. They forget how these interests were 
constructed. However, as Mead affirms, any process of individuation is a process of socialisation 
(Habermas 1972, 1975). Therefore, if the interests have been socially, culturally, or religiously constructed, 
the political sphere ought to incorporate deliberation concerning them, given that politics is inherent in the 
processes through which these interests have been formed (Habermas 1996, 1998, pp. 239-264). 
12 The republican concept of democracy is particularly vulnerable to this error, as it stems from the idea of a 
society which can self-organise as a whole. This overlooks the elements of social and cultural pluralism 
present in society, which ought to be seriously considered given that the interests and values intrinsic in 
such pluralism may conflict within the same community without any perspective for achieving consensus. 
One must not forget that the politically established right needs to be considered legitimate and ‘must be at 
least in harmony with moral principles that claim a general validity that extends beyond the limits of any 
legal community’ (Habermas 1998, p. 245). 
13 For the discussion on the Habermas’s position about the religion role and treatment in a Postsecular 
Societies see for example the Journal Constellations. 14 (2) with articles from Chambers (2007), Cooke 
(2007) and Lafont (2007). 
14 It is important to mention here that his position had previously been ambivalent, vacillating and on 
occasions ambiguous with regard to the relation between religion and reason. See Habermas 1987. 
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reproduce desirable motivations and attitudes. The third is that a sense of mutual 
learning has emerged asynchronically between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ mentalities, 
creating a space for the ‘modernisation of the public conscience’. Accordingly, it has 
become necessary that ‘both sides can… take each other’s contributions to controversial 
public debates seriously for cognitive reasons as well, assuming that they share an 
understanding of the secularization of society as a complementary learning process’ 
(Habermas 2008a, p. 111).  
Thus there is no eliminatory relationship between religious and secular attitudes, 
but rather one of compatibility. As Cortina (1995, p. 13) argues: ‘(I)t is possible to be a 
believer and a citizen and not only is it possible, but it is necessary.’ To put it 
concretely, the post-secular conscience recognises that ‘the public conscience is 
composed of secular and religious traditions which mutually fertilise and transform one 
another’ (Mate 2008, p. 31). Herein lies the importance ‘complementary learning’, in 
the process of which the secular person who wants the believer rationally to value his 
points of view must simultaneously recognise his interlocutor as ‘not wholly irrational'‘ 
in his own views. Movement is needed on both sides: by the believer who must 
‘determine the relation between faith and knowledge self-critically from the perspective 
of secular knowledge’, and by the non-believer who must concede ‘an epistemic status 
as not simply ‘irrational’ from the perspective of secular knowledge’ (Habermas 2008a, 
p. 112). 
Using the logic of this concept of deliberative democracy, based on discourse 
ethics, a series of points can be raised regarding the liberal and reformist arguments 
presented in this article. These arguments focused on two possibilities: i) holding to the 
‘rule’ which applies universally with no exemptions  or ii)  conceding some exceptions 
when these are necessary to enable an active role for religious groups in the public and 
political realm.  
In what follows we propose a comparison between Habermas’s understanding of 
religion, and the liberal and reformist positions. 
Three main points of agreement emerge between liberals and proponents of this 
particular reading of deliberative democracy. Firstly, within the political sphere, holders 
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of religious viewpoints must make the effort to translate their religious beliefs into a 
language which is secular, common and accessible to all. Secondly, the ways of life and 
customs of believers and non-believers must be respected by the State insofar as they 
are compatible with the Constitution. Thirdly, democracy, as based in enlightened 
thought, must incorporate a critical, and self-critical, capacity, in order to maintain the 
necessary civic solidarity and, correspondingly, a shared value ethos and a ‘common 
denominator of values’ (Habermas 2008a, pp. 120-124). 
The areas of agreement with non-liberal (or reformist) arguments can also be 
reduced to three key points. Firstly, historically, religion has played not only a negative 
role but also an extremely important positive one in the defence of democracy and 
human rights. This cannot be neglected. Secondly, the liberal position is asymmetric in 
demanding that the believer constantly separate his religious from his secular beliefs. 
This demand is too burdensome, as ‘many religious citizens would not be able to 
undertake such an artificial division within their own minds without jeopardizing the 
pious conduct of their lives’ (Habermas 2008a, p. 127).  
Therefore: ‘The liberal state must not transform the requisite institutional 
separation of religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for 
those of its citizens who follow a faith. It must of course expect of them that they 
recognise the principle that political authority is exercised with neutrality towards 
competing world views… But all that is required here is the epistemic ability to 
consider one’s own reflexively from the outside and to relate it to secular views.’ 
(Habermas 2008a, p. 130) 
The third point articulates a position shared by various key authors: religious 
traditions possess a potential for knowledge, access to the truth, creation of identity and 
meaning, which must not be avoided in democratic states.15 Aside from their functional 
and motivational value, their content is of great importance. This is especially so given 
that ‘it is also in the interest of the constitutional state to conserve all cultural sources 
that nurture citizens’ solidarity and their normative awareness’ (Habermas 2008a, pp. 
111). Therefore, a liberal democracy ‘must not discourage religious persons and 
                                                 
15 Martha Minow too takes this line (2007, p. 825). 
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communities from also expressing themselves as such in the political arena, for it 
cannot be sure that secular society would not otherwise cut itself off from key resources 
for the creation of meaning and identity’ (Habermas 2008a, p. 131). 
Having identified this common ground, it is important also to indicate where 
discrepancies appear. There are five main points of disagreement with liberals. Firstly, 
Habermas believes that the full effort of translation into a language which is accessible 
to all should not be required for debate in the public sphere. Rather, he believes that, 
religious discussion within this space could take place at less cost, as suggested by non-
liberal or revisionist arguments. Thus, Habermas (2008b) specifies that it is impossible 
to prevent the Church from acting ‘as an interpretative community’ – that is, expressing 
its position in the deliberative phase – but adds that this will succeed only if religious 
opinions are translated into ‘comprehensible and universally plausible arguments’.  
The second point of disagreement lies in Habermas’ insistence that at no point 
should the State ‘assign its citizens duties incompatible with their way of life as 
believers’, and that the State must respect the lifestyles and customs of believers.  
The third point of divergence arises when Habermas suggests that, although the 
liberal democratic model possesses the resources to establish, maintain and defend a 
common, shared democratic ethos, the motivational and functional resources of religion 
may be of great assistance in reviving or supplementing the deficiencies present in its 
realisation. A liberal democracy, faced with certain conflicts, cannot demand the 
necessary political virtues, but can merely suggest what would be the best, or the most 
desirable conduct. In this sense, Habermas identifies a ‘motivational deficit’ in liberal 
democracies incapable of inciting political and civic action.  
The fourth point of conflict is that liberals reject the role granted by Habermas to pastoral 
guidance. He regards it as important so long as ethical criteria are proposed to help issue 
a well thought out and responsible opinion. And the final, and perhaps most important, 
difference lies in the basic understanding of the relation between reason and religion. 
Liberals have drawn a clear line of division, while Habermas defends ‘Hegel’s thesis that 
the major world religions belong to the history of reason itself’ (2008a, p. 6). In this sense 
a Habermasian novelty emerges: ‘making communicative ethics the heir to the ethical 
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virtualities of religion which modern rationality has not known thus far how to make its 
own’ (Mate 2008, p. 30). 
Two points divide the Habermasian position from that of the reformists. Firstly, 
and most importantly, Habermas is in favour of using religious arguments in the pre-
parliamentary public-political sphere. He requires these arguments to pass through a 
process of ‘reflexive self-criticism’. However, he also thinks that a cooperative effort 
should be made by believers and non-believers to bring about translation into a common 
language. Thus, he argues that, ‘whereas citizens of faith may make public contributions 
in their own religious language only subject to the translation proviso, by way of 
compensation secular citizens must open their minds to the possible truth content of 
those presentations and enter into dialogue, so that religious reasons might well emerge 
in the transformed guise of generally accessible arguments. Citizens of a democratic 
polity owe one another good reasons for their political positions’ (Habermas 2008a, p. 
132).  
The second rupture occurs because Habermas, while conceding a relevant role to 
religious reasons via the reflexive self-critical process within the political-public sphere, 
does not do so in the political-juridical realm. He suggests that political legislators 
should abstain from using religious arguments which have not been translated. He 
argues: ‘What is illegitimate is the violation of the principle of the neutrality of the 
exercise of political power which holds that all coercively enforceable political 
decisions must be formulated and be justifiable in a language that is equally intelligible 
to all citizens… The democratic procedure owes its power to generate legitimacy to its 
deliberative character in addition to the fact that it includes all participants; for the 
justified presumption of rational outcomes rests on this in the long run’ (Habermas 
2008a, p. 134). 
By examining the points of agreement and disagreement between liberal and 
reformist arguments, respectively, and deliberative-discourse arguments, we note that 
they arise in large part due to the different concerns at stake. The liberals, for their part, 
are concerned that religion continues to enjoy privileges and exemptions not only in the 
public but also in the political sphere in democratic countries. Their fear is that religion 
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would use such loopholes to seek to dominate the political sphere once again. 
Deliberative democracy is more interested in the possible contribution of religion to a 
rational construction of ethics and politics. Reformists also want religious viewpoints to 
be taken into account, both in the processes of political-public deliberation and, on 
occasion, as the exemption to the law, because of the effect on constitutional principles 
as well as on civil rights. 
This clash of perspectives allows us to assert that the Habermasian proposal 
opens the possibility of going beyond the conflict between multiculturalists and 
neutralists sparked by the idea of ‘rule-and-exemption’. In accordance with Habermas’s 
line of argument, and  rethinking the relation between reason and religion in the light of 
our post-secular context and conscience, it is possible to conceive of exemptions  as 
justified  - in some cases -.so as to allow the role of churches and religious organisations 
as ‘communities of interpretation. We will expand on this point in the next section. 
 
Conclusion: from negotiation to recognition and deliberation  
Our proposal is to explore a middle road which has already been pointed out by other 
authors, though they bring different baggage with them. Martha Minow, for example, 
undertakes a rigorous study of the responses provided by North American 
constitutionalism to the question of whether religious groups should be exempt from 
civil rights laws. She shows that despite two antagonistic responses in the philosophical 
discourse, the history and analysis of the answers produced at national, state and local 
level in North America demonstrate the promise of a third option.  
The two conflicting positions are, on the one hand, a categorical ‘no one, not 
even religious organizations, should be exempt from civil rights laws’ and, on the other, 
a clear ‘religious groups should be exempt from regulations that otherwise would coerce 
their members to violate their religious beliefs’. Minow highlights in her study that, in 
responses in to the United States to petitions for exemptions to the law, there is no clear, 
unequivocal reply. In fact, her work demonstrates that ‘religious groups largely receive 
no exemptions from laws prohibiting race discrimination, some exemptions from laws 
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forbidding gender discrimination, and explicit and implicit exemptions from rules 
forbidding sexual orientation discrimination’ (Minow 2007, p. 782).  
Minow points to a third path between the ‘categorical no’ and the ‘rotund yes’. 
This is the path of negotiation, ‘especially with the strategy of identifying solutions that 
satisfy the religious groups and the civil rights advocates’. This negotiation implies, on 
the one hand, a cost-benefit analysis with respect to the overall good to civil and 
political society, and on the other, the use of attitudes of respect, flexibility, and 
humility that ‘can help generate new answers beyond ‘exemption’ and ‘no exemption’ 
when religious principles and civil rights laws collide’ (Minow 2007, p. 844). She adds 
that ‘(t)he collision between a religious group and civil rights advocates resembled a 
clash of absolutes’ (Minow 2007, p. 839). 
Although this is an interesting discussion of the possibility of recovering 
political-public virtues such as respect, flexibility and humility, our view is that, in a 
negotiating context, such virtues are of little use, given the inequality of conditions 
between interlocutors. Moreover, one must take into account the fact that these virtues 
must be learned, and cannot be imposed through laws or politics. 
We consider these virtues to be innate. They gain motivational strength to act in 
cultural and religious communities. In this sense, a deliberative democracy cannot 
dispose of its functional and motivational role in generating meaning. The key lies in 
having such virtues placed in the service of the search for reciprocal recognition both in 
the political sphere and in pre-parliamentary discourses in the public-political realm. 
This mutual recognition implies the introduction of controversial questions into public 
discourse, so that both secular and religious arguments can be made. As Habermas 
explains: ‘Mutual recognition implies, among other things, that religious and secular 
citizens are willing to listen and to learn from each other in public debates’ (2008a, p. 
3). 
The only way out is to take a path of ‘mutual learning’, on which the believer as 
well as the non-believer must undertake a cooperative task and translate his arguments 
into a language shared by and accessible to all. The door is open so that, in cases where 
translation is impossible, the matter will not disappear from the public-political sphere, 
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though it will not be able to pass into the political-juridical sphere until the process of 
mutual learning is complete. 
Our proposal is that, in order to judge whether the discourses satisfy the 
principles of discourse ethics mentioned in this article – in order, in other words, to 
respond to the question of how well these discourses comply with the moral 
expectations that any person may hold – four conditions must be met: 
1) Inclusion and public character: no person who may make a relevant 
contribution in relation to the controversial validity may be excluded. 
2) Equality in communication: all interlocutors are to be granted the 
same opportunities to express themselves regarding the issue at hand. 
3)  Exclusion of trickery and illusion: participants must believe in what 
they say.  
4)  Lack of coercion: communication must be free of restrictions, as 
these prevent the best argument from emerging and predetermine the 
outcome of the discussion (Habermas 1998, 3-46 and Habermas 
2008a, p. 50). 
Thus, if deliberation about controversial questions in the political and the public-
political sphere is a necessary condition, within a democracy, for the definition of norms 
and principles acceptable to any human being for the governing of their political and 
public life, it is not a sufficient condition for civic solidarity among members. In other 
words, political virtues must be rooted in concrete contexts if they are to take hold. 
Blocking the potential of religion (for example by reducing opportunities for religious 
education), or denying public recognition of citizens’ religious identity would be a 
grave error in constructing a democratic ethos. However, granting privileges and 
exemptions without carefully examining arguments and justifications could lead to 
ethically and politically unjustified treatment.  
In this vein, it might be said that, faced with demands for exemption for 
churches as ‘communities of interpretation’ and as ‘motivational sources’, liberal 
democracies should take a deliberative path. For example, participation should be 
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possible in the great debates which Western pluralist societies have held openly for 
decades, under the conditions set out in this article. Participation is not a guarantee that 
an exemption will be granted but, in some cases, it could happen. In our view, this could 
apply in the case of at least these requests for exemption: adjustment of the school 
curriculum to teach religious values and a framework of tax relief to churches so as to 
ensure that organisation (this is important to maintain lively religious communities, 
which may otherwise disappear or face hardship); exemptions to dress codes and even 
to some rules related to school menus (which are a form of public recognition of 
citizens together with their religious identity). The key point is the promotion of public 
and political deliberation on this and other topics, where the process of ‘complementary 
learning’ becomes a touchstone for the building of a shared democratic ethos, and, 
accordingly, where the potential of churches as ‘communities of interpretation’ is fully 
recognised.  
To conclude: exemptions in this approach are considered as a means to allow 
churches and religious organisations to flourish, and to recognise their crucial role in the 
public sphere and in deliberative democracy as source of values and motivation. We 
believe that this contributes to a new perspective on the relationship between religion 
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